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First Amendment-Federal Procedure-Dissemination
of Discovery Materials Is Constitutionally Protected
In re Halkin *
I. Introduction
The translation of the constitutional language "Congress shall make no
law ... abridging the freedom of speech; or of the press. . ."I into a sound and
practicable system of law is a task that has often confronted the judiciary with
singularly difficult choices between the exercise of free speech and other impor-
tant public purposes. The response of the courts to these challenges has been
steadfast in its insistence that other interests yield to the primacy of the first
amendment. Although restrictions on expression have often been advanced in
defense of the most urgent public interests, judges have been especially sen-
sitive to the cardinal values behind the constitutional guarantee of freedom of
expression. The preeminent role of freedom of speech in an open, democratic
society-its indispensability to self-government, its catalytic function in social
change, its importance to the cultivation of individual dignity-has dictated a
course of extreme caution whenever speech is jeopardized by government in-
fringement. 2
This reverence is particularly apparent in the judicial reluctance to sanc-
tion any form of interference with speech. Where reconciliation of freedom of
expression with competing policies ultimately has proven unavoidable, courts
have tolerated only finely tuned restrictions, calculated to achieve narrowly
defined objectives without impinging needlessly on protected speech.3 The
primary mission of the courts in each first amendment case remains constant:
preserve the integrity of the constitutional grant, while fitting "its values and
functions into a more comprehensive scheme of social goals. ' 4
In re Halkin5 presented the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Col-
umbia Circuit with a dispute similar in form to many previous first amendment
controversies, yet unique in several notable respects. The question before the
court concerned whether the first amendment limits the permissibility of pro-
tective orders which prohibit the dissemination of materials obtained pursuant
to the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Both the
lengthy majority opinion and a vigorous dissent considered i'n detail the fun-
damental issues raised by the collision between the public interest in protecting
the fairness of the discovery process and the constitutional guarantee of
freedom of expression. In holding that the dissemination of discovery materials
* 598 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
1 U. S. CONST. amend. I.
2 See, e.g., T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6-7 (1970); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW 9 12-1, at 576 (1978).
3 See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175
(1968).
4 See T. EMERSON, supra note 2, at 9.
5 598 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
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is protected by the first amendment, the Halkin court confirmed the viability of
the constitutional grant of freedom of speech in contexts in which other in-
terests may press to curtail its safeguards.
II. The Halkin Dilemma:
Free Expression vs. Full and Fair Discovery
Halkin arose as a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the federal
district court to vacate an order prohibiting the plaintiffs in Halkin v. Helms 6
from releasing to the public documents which they had obtained through
discovery. The plaintiffs in the parent case were a group of individuals and
organizations who alleged that certain government agencies, principally the
Central Intelligence Agency, 7 had conducted programs of illegal domestic
surveillance of citizens who opposed the Vietnam War. The plaintiffs contend-
ed that these actions deprived them of constitutional and statutory rights, and
sought equitable relief and monetary damages.
The dispute arose after the defendants submitted to the plaintiffs certain
documents describing the CIA's program of surveillance of anti-war activists
pursuant to a discovery request under Fed.R.Civ.P. 34. Though the materials
were purged of national security information and other sensitive matter, they
contained significant new revelations on the CIA's domestic exploits. Upon
learning that the plaintiffs intended to release.portions of the material to the
press, the defendants sought a protective order under Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c),8
claiming that the ensuing publicity would deprive them of a fair trial. The
district court granted the motion, ruling that disclosure was "contrary to rules
applicable to litigation before this court, and inconsistent with the obligations
of the parties and counsel to,- further the just determination of the matters
within its jurisdiction." 9 The order prohibited both the release of the
documents themselves and statements by counsel or parties concerning their
6 Civ. No. 75-1773 (D.D.C. June 30, 1977).
7 Hereinafter cited as CIA.
8 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c) provides:
(c) Protective Orders. Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is
sought, and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending or alternatively, on
matters relating to a deposition, the court in the district when the deposition is to be taken may
make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrass-
ment, oppression, or undue burden and expense, including orie or more of the following: (1) that
the discovery not be had; (2) that the discovery may be had but only on specified terms and condi-
tions, including a designation of the time or place; (3) that the discovery may be had only by a
method of discovery other than that selected by the party seeking discovery; (4) that certain mat-
ters not be inquired into, or that the scope of discovery be limited to certain matters; (5) that the
discovery be conducted with no one present except persons designated by the court; (6) that a
deposition after being sealed be opened only by order of the court; (7) that a trade secret, or other
confidential research development or commercial information not be disclosed or be disclosed on-
ly in a designated way; (8) that parties simultaneously file specified documents or information
enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by the court.
If the motion for a protective order is denied in whole or in part, the court may, on such
terms and conditions as are just, order that any party or person provide or permit discovery. The
provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award of expenses incurred in relation to the motion.
9 598 F.2d at 182, n.8. Despite the district court's order, the material it sought to suppress was the
subject of an article in the Feb. 22, 1977, edition of the New York Times.
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content. Plaintiffs responded by applying to the court of appeals for a writ of
mandamus to vacate the order.10
On review, the majority in Halkin characterized the challenged order as
"direct government action limiting speech" and looked to the doctrine of prior
restraint for guidance. I The court concluded that lawyers and parties retain a
large measure of their rights to express themselves freely while engaged in
litigation, and that these first amendment rights are not significantly altered
when the expression consists of the dissemination of materials obtained
through discovery.
The decision prescribes a standard for constitutionally assessing the pro-
priety of protective orders that tamper with the first amendment interests of
lawyers and litigants in information received through discovery. The test re-
quires an evaluation of three criteria: the harm posed by dissemination must be
"substantial and serious"; the order must be "narrowly drawn and precise"
and there must be no alternative means available to protect the public interest
threatened, which intrude less directly on expression. 12 Examining the order
under this standard, the majority found it seriously defective, and remanded
the case to the district court for reconsideration.
III. Protective Orders as Prior Restraints
Both the majority and the dissent in Halkin recognized that the challenged
protective order possessed many of the characteristics of a prior restraint, the
most rigidly scrutinized type of interference with free expression.1 3 In classic,
common law form, prior restraints were unreviewable administrative censor-
ship or licensing schemes which required that certain types of speech be ap-
proved in advance by a supervisory authority.' 4 By their very nature, these
systems fostered widespread abuse and oppression. The first amendment was
adopted with the objective of precluding their rebirth under the Constitution. 1 5
This profound suspicion of prior restraint remains undiminished today,
rooted in an appreciation of their peculiarly inhibitive effect on speech.
Although the threat of punishment for speech may understandably deter its ex-
ercise, prior restraints on expression have an even more pronounced chilling
impact on free expression, chiefly for three reasons.
First, prior censorship is characteristically prone to malignant excesses. As
the Supreme Court has noted, "It is always difficult to know in advance what
an individual will say, and the line between legitimate and illegitimate speech
is so finely drawn that risks of freewheeling censorship are formidable. " 16
Secondly, where imposed, prior restraints are not regulated by the wide
array of procedural guarantees inherent in a criminal prosecution.' 7 Prior in-
10 In accord with its standard practice, although the court viewed the petition favorably, the case was
remanded for action by the district court consistent with the majority opinion.
11 598 F.2d at 183.
12 Id. at 191.
13 Chief Justice Burger described prior restraint as "the least tolerable infringement on First Amend-
ment rights." 427 U.S. at 559.
14 See T. EMERSON, supra note 2, at 504.
15 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931).
16 Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 559 (1975).
17 427 U.S. at 559.
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terference with expression exerts an "immediate and irreyersible sanction," 18
while a criminal penalty or -defamation judgment may be deferred until the
completion of an often exhaustive appellate review process, thereby dampening
its impact.
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the ability to issue a pre-
publication restraint empowers government authorities to shroud from sight
information potentially worthy of public appraisal.' 9 Even where the prohibi-
tion is temporary, the damage can be acute, since the state is able to moderate
the impact of a revelation through control of the timing of public dissemina-
tion.20 Often the choice of when to disseminate can be as crucial to the effect of
information on public affairs as the choice of what to disseminate. The par-
ticipation of government in this decision-making process plainly offends the
principles that are represented in the constitutional protection of freedom- of
speech. 21
Alert to these concerns, and anxious to preserve the guarantee of freedom
of speech in general, courts have displayed consistent hostility toward prior
obstruction of expression in any form. The common law concept of prior
restraint has accordingly been extended to include judicial orders ac-
complishing the same result. 22 Parties seeking to impose a prior restraint must
initially overcome an extraordinarily heavy presumption against its validity. 23
Prior restraints will be upheld only in certain "exceptional cases,' '24 and ample
procedural safeguards must be observed to minimize the suppression of pro-
tected speech. 25 Current decisions suggest that prior restraints will be void
unless (i) the result the restriction is designed to prevent is clearly harmful and
reasonably certain to occur without the intrusion; (ii) the scope of the restraint
is scrupulously tailored to avoid overbreadth; and (iii) no alternatives are
available that impinge less directly on expression. 26
The court's characterization of the order in Halkin as a form of prior
restraint was appropriate in light of its practical effect. The cumulative impact
of the order is closely reminiscent of many of the hazards that the heavy
presumption against prior restraints is designed to avoid. The order was im-
posed without the protections of the criminal process; its impact was immediate
and pronounced, while willful violations would have resulted in an almost cer-
tain conviction for contempt. 27 If obeyed, damage to first amendment rights is
real and irreparable. Though issued in connection with the discovery process,
18 Id.
19 See T. EMERSON, supra note 2, at 504.
20 427 U.S. at 559.
-21 See text accompanying note 2 supra.
22 Court orders can have the impact ofadministrative prior restraints through the operation of the "col-
lateral bar" rule, which prohibits those who violate a court injunction from later raising the order's constitu-
tionality as a defense in a subsequent contempt proceeding. Thus, the order to refrain from speaking must
be obeyed, or a conviction for contempt will be virtually certain to follow. Walker v. Birmingham, 388 U.S.
307 (1967).
23 See 427 U.S. at 559; 393 U.S. at 181.
24 283 U.S. at 716. Chief Justice Hughes offered as examples of such cases orders by a government
preventing "actual obstruction to its recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates of transports or
the number and location of troops." Id.
25 See, e.g., Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965).
26 See 427 U.S. 539 (1976); 420 U.S. 546 (1975); Kingsley Books v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957); See also
L. TRIBE, supra note 2, 5 12-33.
27 See note 20 sup ra.
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the challenged order represented a sufficient threat to protected speech to war-
rant close judicial scrutiny.
IV. First Amendment Rights in the Discovery Process
The determination by the court that the order in Halkin operated as a prior
restraint was preliminary to the resolution of the central issue of whether first
amendment rights were assertable in the dissemination of discovery materials.
If, as the defendants contended, these rights were of a sharply limited nature,
then an order restricting the release of the documents would be valid. The ma-
jority approached the problem with a two-step analysis. At the outset, the court
evaluated the scope of first amendment rights of participants in litigation with
regard to extrajudicial comment in general. The court then focused on the state
of these rights when the particular act of expression by litigants involves only
the dissemination of discovery matter.
A. Judicial Restraints on Parties and Counsel: Extrajudicial Comment
Although it is clear that persons who resort to the courts for relief do not
forfeit their first amendment rights, the exact extent of these rights has yet to be
delineated. The Halkin court relied heavily on the leading case on the question,
Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 28 which outlines the strong first amendment
interests existing in extrajudicial comment by lawyers and litigants.
In Bauer, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged the value of litigation as a
form of expression in itself, as well as a means to redress individual grievances.
Civil trials present frequent occasion for the exercise of legitimate first amend-
ment rights. The Bauer court also observed:
Civil litigation in general often exposes the need for government action or cor-
rection. Such revelations should not be kept from the public. Yet it is only the
attorney who will have this knowledge or realize its significance ...
Therefore, we should be extremely skeptical about any rule that silences that
voice. 29
Recognizing that statements by parties and their attorneys fall solidly
within the ambit of constitutional protection, the Halkin court considered what
circumstances justify judicial restriction of such comment. The Supreme Court
has left this issue unsettled by twice inviting judges to resort to the use of no-
comment orders to parties and lawyers when necessary, but without indicating
the extent to which this device is limited by the first amendment. 30 Lower
federal courts faced with this problem have been relatively uniform in their
refusal to authorize restraining orders to lawyers and litigants without a show-
ing of a clear and imminent threat to a fair trial posed by extrajudicial com-
28 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 912 (1976).
29 Id. at 258.
30 The Supreme Court has twice suggested no-comment orders to counsel as a means to combat
prejudicial pretrial publicity. 427 U.S. at 564; Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 360 (1966).
[February 1980]
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ment. 31 In Bauer, the Seventh Circuit held that the rights of lawyers to com-
ment publicly could be limited only upon a showing of a "serious and immi-
nent threat of interference with the administration of justice. "32
The majority in Halkin also relied on two other federal court of appeals
decisions nullifying restrictions on out-of-court statements by participants in
litigation, Chase v. Robson33 and CBS, Inc. v. Young. 34 As in Bauer, both cases
demanded that a rigorous burden be surmounted before a restraining order
would be issued.
The Halkin court's finding that extrajudicial comment is constitutionally
protected is in accord with applicable precedent and is duly attentive to the
undeniable first amendment interests associated with the adjudicative process.
The common thrust of the available decisions posits that public remarks during
litigation, like speeches on a street corner, should be suppressed only to protect
an important competing interest. No convincing rationale exists for muzzling
lawyers and parties at the will of the trial judge solely because of their status as
participants in a judicial proceeding. The majority's position is appropriately
oriented toward the content of the public statements, thereby avoiding for-
malistic distinctions based on the role of the speaker. Labeling a lawyer as an
officer of the court offers no insight into the value his extrajudicial statements
may have in informing the public, or the danger they may pose to significant
countervailing interests. The court's balancing analysis is more instructive for
first amendment purposes, weighing the value of the speaker's remarks against
the prospect of injury to significant rivaling considerations.
B. Judicial Restraints on Parties and Counsel; Dissemination of Discovery Material
Having found that out-of-court utterances by parties and their counsel are
protected from impermissible interference by the first amendment, the court
turned to the statements forbidden by the challenged order. For the dissent, the
fact that the order restrained the dissemination by counsel and parties of
discovery materials produced a critical difference in the levels of first amend-
ment protection available. The thesis of the dissenting opinion is that discovery
materials, regardless of content, reside in a unique category of information
with respect to the first amendment, in which the rights to freedom of speech of
those who possess them are conditional on the power vested in the trial court by
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. According to this view, dissemifation of
materials obtained through discovery could by restricted simply upon a show-
ing of "good cause" under rule 26(c). 35
31 See Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 912
(1976); CBS, Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1975); Chase v. Robson, 435 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970).
32 522 F.2d at 249.
33 435 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970). Chase involved an order prohibiting lawyers and parties in a criminal
case from making any comment regarding the jury, the merits, the evidence, the witnesses, or the rulings of
the court. The Seventh Circuit found no sufficient basis for the order, and condemned it also as overbroad.
34 522 F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1975). CBS, Inc. was a petition for a writ of mandamus to vacate a trial court's
order preventing litigants and their attorneys from making any comment on a pending case. The Sixth Cir-
cuit termed the order a "direct prior restraint" on freedom of expression, invalid unless there could be
shown some serious and imminent threat to a fair trial posed by statements of the parties. Id. at 239.
35 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
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The majority maintained, however, that the rights of lawyers and litigants
to freedom of expression are not fundamentally altered simply because the in-
formation they seek to publicize is obtained through discovery. Looking to the
Supreme Court's decision in New York Times v. United States3s6 the court rejected
the notion that first amendment protection for a particular act of expression is
somehow dependent on the source of the information, rather than on the
nature of its content.
In New York Times, the Supreme Court ruled that the publication of stolen
materials could not be obstructed by a judicial order without a clear showing of
harm to an important competing interest. 37
The majority found further support for its position in United States v. Mar-
chetti,38 in which the Fourth Circuit held that the publication of materials ob-
tained in breach of a security agreement could not be prevented by the govern-
ment, if the materials were not classified state secrets. The Halkin court per-
suasively reasoned that if first amendment rights were cognizable in these
materials, then plainly they must exist with at least equal force in discovery
materials.
Judge Bazelon's majority opinion also pointedly identified the distinction
between first amendment rights of access to information and first amendment
rights while in possession of information. The Supreme Court has thus far
declined to create a first amendment right of access to sources of information,
or to information in the custody of another.3 9 Once access has been obtained in
some manner, however, speech concerning such information is fully shielded
from government intrusion by the first amendment, regardless of the means of
acquisition.4 0 Justification for the imposition of a prior restraint must derive
from reasons other than the identity of the source of the material. The applica-
tion of this principle to Halkin is apparent: although the Court may deny access
to discovery matter without reference to the first amendment, restrictions on a
party's use of information in his possession must carefully avoid impingement
on his constitutional rights.
The dissent relied on International Products Corp. v. Koons,4 1 decided before
New York Times, and dicta in Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., 42 to buttress its
contention that first amendment interests in discovery materials are fundamen-
tally limited in nature. In Koons, the Second Circuit stated that there was "no
doubt as to the constitutionality of a rule allowing a federal court to forbid the
publicizing, in advance of trial, of information obtained by one party from
another by use of the court's processes." ' 43 The majority interpreted the
36 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
37 The government in that case failed to demonstrate that the release of a Pentagon report on the con-
duct of the Vietnam War threatened national security. The government contended unsuccessfully that the
embarrassment to American foreign policy connected with the report was sufficient to warrant its suppres-
sion. Id. at 714.
38 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972).
39 Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974). In a recent decision, the court also declined to grant
the press a right of access to a criminal preliminary hearing based on the sixth amendment. Subsequent
decisions may clarify the significance of this ruling. Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 99 S. Ct. 2898 (1979).
40 See text accompanying note 37 supra.
41 325 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1963).
42 536 F.2d 1001 (3d Cir. 1976).
43 325 F.2d at 407.
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Koons language to mean that a properly drafted protective order, supported by
a sufficient showing of good cause, could be compatible with the first amend-
ment. 44 Judge Bazelon argued, moreover, that broader construction of Koons
would imply that parties waived their first amendment rights when they en-
gaged in discovery. The majority held that if such an implied waiver did occur,
it was in any case void as an unenforceable prior restraint. 45
The majority's decision that first amendment protections attach to the
dissemination of discovery materials is consistent with its holding on the rights
of lawyers and litigants and clearly preferable to the dissent's strained argu-
ment for conditional rights in such information. No convincing basis exists for
substantially excluding speech concerning discovery matter from first amend-
ment protection. A refusal to acknowledge more than partial first amendment
interests in discovery materials would conflict with the Supreme Court's grant
of full protection from impermissible prior restraints to stolen information in
New York Times.
A special distinction involving discovery materials would assign an in-
flated significance to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, despite the fact that
the promulgation of the rules did not signify the announcement of revised con-
stitutional doctrine. With -respect to at least one section of the rules, the
discovery sanction provisions described in rule 37, the Supreme Court has ex-
plicitly held that the rule "must be read in light of the provisions of the fifth
amendment that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of
law.''46 The Court's unambiguous statement appears to eliminate any
reasonable grounds for a claim that the rules conferred new powers on the
courts, or reinterpreted the large body of first amendment law.
The majority was not indifferent to the need to prevent disruption of the
trial court's control over the discovery process. The court declined, however, to
override legitimate first amendment rights to preserve that control. The
strength of the majority's position lies in its allowance for protection of the right
of freedom of speech without significant impairment of the court's authority to
regulate the discovery process.
V. Rule 26(c) "Good Cause" and the First Amendment
The conclusion of the majority that the district court's order operated as a
prior restraint, coupled with its decision that first amendment rights are asser-
table in the dissemination of discovery materials did not complete the court's
analysis. The majority proceeded to articulate a standard for determining
under what circumstances the exercise of these rights could be restricted by a
protective order. By necessity, Fed.Rule Civ.P. 26(c) vests considerable discre-
44 This view of Koons was also adopted in a federal district court decision holding that a party does have
First Amendment rights in information about in the discovery process. Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 428
F. Supp. 200, 204-05 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
45 The Fourth Circuit had earlier held that the agreement signed by Marchetti, a government
employee, waiving his first amendment rights, was void to the extent that it precluded him from releasing to
the public nonclassified material.
The Halkin plaintiffs received the materials free of any express conditions on their use. Halkin should
not be understood as holding that no conditions placed in advance on use of discovery matter could be valid.
46 Societe Internationale, Etc. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 209 (1958).
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tion in the trial judge to monitor the progress of discovery. The rule itself re-
quires only a showing of "good cause" to issue a protective order. 47 The osten-
sible object of the rule is to permit discovery to be conducted in an equitable
manner, free from abuses by litigants in unjustifiably refusing discovery or
seeking to employ it for some improper purpose. 48 The provision most nearly
referring to the situation in Halkin, rule 26(c)(7), states that a court may order,
upon a showing of good cause, "that a trade secret or other confidential
research, development, or commercial information not be disclosed, or be
disclosed only in a designated way." 49 The language suggests that the drafters
contemplated the rule to apply primarily to restrictions on the use of commer-
cial information, a class of speech receiving significantly less constitutional pro-
tection than the reports on governmental acts suppressed in Halkin.5 0 The rule
is silent on the permissibility of restricting the use of noncommercial informa-
tion obtained through discovery.
Quite clearly, the first amendment demands a different type of inquiry
than the sort a court might pursue in deciding whether to strike an improper in-
terrogatory. The bare language "good cause" furnishes inadequate guidance
to trial judges weighing motions for orders that restrict freedom of speech. The
majority remedied this difficulty by importing into the framework of rule 26(c)
a three-part test for evaluating the propriety of protective orders that function
as prior restraints. In essence, the court ruled that a far more stringent type of
"good cause" must be shown before an order infringing on free speech may
lawfully issue.
The first criterion of the court's standard requires that the harm the order
is intended to prevent be substantial and serious. The determination of the
nature and extent of the putative harm threatened will often be pivotal to the
decision to issue the requested order. Such an assessment will unavoidably en-
tail a balancing of the strength of the first amendment interests at stakt against
the urgency of the interests imperiled by disclosure. As the majority suggested,
different levels of first amendment protection accompany different types of
materials. Strong policy interests militate against the release of national securi-
ty information. 51 Parties may claim only limited rights to disseminate trade
secrets, commercial information,5 2 or material that intrudes needlessly on
legitimate privacy rights of third parties. 53 In contrast, political expression and
information contained in public records54 are sheltered by the foremost of first
amendment protections. Balanced against these interests are the various com-
peting considerations that disclosure may endanger, most typically the fairness
of the pending proceeding.
55
47 FEn. R. Civ. P. 26 (c).
48 See 8 C. WRiHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2036, at 267 (1970).
49 FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (c).
50 Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978).
51 466 F.2d at 1316-17.
52 See note 50 supra.
53 The Supreme Court has not ruled directly on the question of the degree to which the privacy interests
of others may limit the exercise of first amendment rights. At least one state court has held that third party
privacy rights do pose a limit on freedom of speech. Commonwealth v. Wiseman, 356 Mass. 251, 249
N.E.2d 610 (1969).
54 See Landmark Communication, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 838-39 (1978); Cox Broadcasting v.
Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 495-96 (1975); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1966).
55 The majority opinion observed that the right to a fair trial is decidedly more pronounced in criminal
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Secondly, the majority established that a specific demonstration of fact be
made showing a concrete threat to an important countervailing interest. The
requirement that the order be aimed precisely at the prevention of a certain and
immediate threat is similar to the burden to be met to justify any prior
restraint. In the Halkin case, the defendants failed to show the harm to their
right to a fair trial justified the suppression of information concerning alleged
government misconduct.
In the discovery context, a serious shortcoming of this type of requirement
is avoided by minimizing the judicial guesswork in predicting the harm to be
caused by the speech challenged. Judge Bazelon suggested that material could
be studied by the court in camera to enable a more precise determination of the
extent of the harm threatened, and consequently a more appropriately cir-
cumscribed order.
Finally, the majority's standard mandates that the trial court find no other
means of avoiding the threatened harm are available which impinge less direct-
ly on expression, a requirement found in other freedom of speech cases as well
as in other areas of constitutional law. 56 In this setting, the majority assures
that trial courts will exhaust other options to effectively guard competing policy
interests before turning to the imposition of a prior restraint.
VI. Consequences of Halkin: The Remaining Vitality of 26(c)
Although the dissent warned that the majority's standard robs 26(c) of its
meaning, this concern seems to overstate the probable impact of Halkin. The
underlying premise of the court's holding is merely that the language of the
rule must be interpreted with the governing assumption that the federal rules
do not supersede constitutional protection of individual liberties. Under the
majority's constitutional standard for issuing protective orders that curb ex-
pression, it seems evident that orders can be drafted which permissibly prevent
public disclosure when necessary to prevent abuse of the discovery system.
Judge Bazelon remarked that judges should experience "no difficulty" in
drafting orders covering specifically identified materials in conformity with the
first amendment.5 7 The court added that a protective order could be tailored to
avoid the infirmities associated with judicial prior restraints in all but "unusual
circumstances.'"58
The crucial ingredient in the court's formula may be the type of speech
under attack. At stake in Halkin was the attempted release of highly newswor-
thy documents pertaining to government activity, an act of political expression
that summons to its defense the highest first amendment protections. 59
Disputes over the release of genuine trade secrets or confidential information,
cases than in civil litigation, and courts generally must be more witchful for danger of prejudice. See text ac-
companying note 39 supra.
56 See, e.g., United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. I (1977) (contract clause); Dean Milk Co.
v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951) (state regulation of commerce).
57 598 F.2d at 194.
58 Id. In camera inspection of documents should provide useful assistance in this task.
59 See 435 U.S. at 838-39; 420 U.S. at 495-96; 384 U.S. at 218-19.
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however, raise a considerably different issue and concern more restricted first
amendment interests. 60
The potential effect of Halkin on the federal discovery system is also
limited by the infrequency with which similar cases arise. As the scarcity of
precedent on which the panel could rely indicates, it is an atypical case in
which the first amendment has been interposed as an objection to restrictions
on the use of discovery information. The principal function of 26(c) is to deter-
mine what limitations should be imposed on the scope of discovery, not to
define what limitations should be placed on the use of information produced. 61
Where parties have sought prohibitions on extrajudicial use, they have done so
primarily to safeguard commercial confidences. 62 Halkin represents the excep-
tional situation in which undeniably strong first amendment rights exist in the
discovered materials. When these interests are threatened with encroachment
by overreaching protective orders, Halkin compels courts to undertake a man-
datory analysis and make specific findings before interfering with speech. The
net impact of the majority's test is to accommodate highly valued first amend-
ment rights without disrupting the firm control that courts exert over the
discovery process.
VII. Conclusion
In re Halkin confronted the District of Columbia Circuit with a clash be-
tween a trial court's extensive power to police the civil discovery process and
the individual's fundamental right to free speech. Acknowledging the threat to
protected speech embodied in the district court's order, the majority perceived
that the resolution of the case depended on an initial inquiry into the scope of
first amendment rights retained by persons who resort to the courts for redress.
The court's conclusion that these rights may be fully exercised in the absence of
a clear showing of a palpable danger to some significant competing interest,
combined with the Supreme Court's holding in New York Times, points in-
evitably to the further conclusion that these rights are not diminished when the
expression consists of the dissemination of discovery matter. The extension in
New York Times of protection from prior restraint to materials obtained by theft
discredits the dissent's view that such protection is drastically limited in the
case of discovery materials because they have been obtained under the auspices
of a trial court. Significantly, both Halkin and New York Times involved at-
tempts to suppress the release of information concerning highly questionable
government activity. 63 The disclosures in both cases were acts of political ex-
pression that activated the broadest constitutional protection.
The standard adopted in Halkin for determining the propriety of orders
restricting public disclosure of discovery information is consistent with con-
stitutional standards for evaluating the permissibility of other prior restraints.
The test incorporates within the context of the discovery system the means by
60 436 U.S. at 455-56.
61 See 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 48, § 2035, at 260 (1970).
62 Id. § 2043, at 300.
63 403 U.S. at 714.
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which the court may weigh the first amendment interests of litigants and par-
ties against countervailing considerations, without undue detriment to the
discovery process or inhibition to free speech. After Halkin, the alternative of
imposing a restraining order remains open to the trial court, but its use is not
insulated from first amendment limitations. Where conflict between the first
amendment and the discovery system arises, Halkin affirms that the federal
rules must bend, if only slightly, to accommodate the constitutional guarantee
of freedom of speech.
Thomas M. Byrne
